Overview

With what lenses are we to look at the above pending amendment? Our options are defined by the Freedom struggle, the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution of India.

First, the mandate of the Freedom struggle conveyed by Gandhiji to the Constituent Assembly:

I have not pictured a poverty-stricken India containing ignorant millions.

 

Establish village swaraj – make each village self-governing and self-contained as regards the essential needs of its inhabitants.

-          Mahatma Gandhi

Two, the mandate of the Constituent Assembly while it adopted Article 40 of the Directive Principles:

Article 40:

The state shall take steps to organize village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government. 

 

While moving the above amendment, K. Santhanam put on record the intent of the Constituent Assembly in unambiguous terms:

What is attempted to do here is to give a definite and unequivocal direction that the State shall take steps to organize panchayats and shall endow them with necessary powers and authority to enable them to function as units of self-government. That the entire structure of self-government, of independence in this country should be based on organized village community life is the common factor of all the amendments tabled and that factor has been made the principal basis of this amendment. I hope it will meet with unanimous acceptance.           

Three, the background to the 73^rd Amendment of the Constitution and its direction.

 

Introducing the Amendment, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi told Parliament:

I toured hundreds of villages. I spoke to countless people. There, in their hearths and homes, I experienced the cruelty of an unresponsive administration, the oppression of an administration without a heart, the callous lack of compassion that most of our people find at the hands of much of our administration. 

We learnt that a grassroots administration without political authority was like a meal without salt. We learnt that however well-intentioned our district bureaucracy might be, without effective elected authority the gap between the people and the bureaucracy could not be closed.  We learnt that the vacuum created by the absence of local level political authority had spawned the power brokers who occupy the gap between the people and their representatives in distant Vidhan Sabhas and the ever more remote Parliament. We learnt that corruption could only be ended by giving power to the panchayats and making panchayats responsible to the people. We learnt that inefficiency could only be ended by entrusting the people at the grass root level with the responsibility for their own development. We learnt that callousness could only be ended by empowering the people to send their own representatives to institutions of local self-government.

The Parliament passed the 73^rd Amendment unanimously – with support from all political parties.

Four, the statement of Objects and Reasons placed in Parliament with the 73^rd Amendment:

It is pertinent to recall the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the aforesaid Constitution Amendment Bill.  It provides both a perspective and yardstick to measure the progress following the 73^rd / 74^th Amendments:

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

Article 40 of the Constitution which enshrines one of the Directive Principles of State Policy lays down that the State shall take steps to organize village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government. In the light of the experience in the last forty years and in view of the shortcomings, which have been observed, it is considered that there is an imperative need to enshrine in the Constitution certain basic and essential features of Panchayati Raj Institutions to impart certainty, continuity and strength to them.

Five, the 73^rd Amendment directed all states to amend their legislation on Panchayats in conformity with the letter and spirit of the 73^rd Amendment within a year.

 

Finally

Did these unambiguous objects and reasons governing the Amendments make a better impression on our political and administrative ruling class than what the resolution of the Constituent Assembly accompanying Article 40 of the Directive Principles of State Policy had made forty years – (1950 to 1990) ago?

 

Alas, not.  In 2002, a Standing Committee of Parliament (with MPs across parties and from both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha) reviewed the progress of implementation of the 73^rd amendment relating to panchayats in the 10-year period since the enactment of these Amendments in April 1993, regretfully concluded that the 10-year record of implementation by the central and state governments was not only woeful but “the States were wilfully flouting Constitutional provisions”[1].

 

The Committee reports that at one stage, the Supreme Court had to intervene and rule that “the concerned states cannot be permitted to withhold election of panchayats … It will be unfortunate if the states remain insensitive to the Constitutional Mandate”. The apex court also held that “Any legislative device of the government which comes into direct conflict with the mandatory provisions of Article 243E of the Constitution, such device has to be declared as ultra vires of the said provisions of the Constitution.”

 

The committee observed that even after ten years, what was lacking was “a framework in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution to devolve appropriate powers so that the elected bodies could be made functional in totality.”  It was “constrained to note that most of the States are yet to fully and conscientiously implement article 243G of the Constitution”[2].

 

It can be seen that the pending Amendment to the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, is totally violative of the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and repulsive of its clear mandate to create institutions of self-government at the panchayat level.

 

1.     Background:

Over the past years we have witnessed a deliberate erosion of Panchayati Raj. A popular notion is that the law is weak in this regard, the natural consequence of Article 243G providing flexibility to States to determine the ambit of devolution to Panchayats. However, a close examination of facts show that this is incorrect – in fact, Karnataka has passed strong laws, but these are weakly implemented. The means adopted to institutionally weaken Panchayati Raj are not through the law, but through executive actions. 

The recent amendment to the Panchayat Raj Act giving MLAs powers over grama sabhas is one example of this. This amendment is contrary to the spirit of decentralisation and the Constitution itself. If this amendment becomes law – the price we pay will be our right as rural voters to participate directly in local self government in Karnataka. We will lose the only forum we have, the Gram Sabha, to exercise our right to choose beneficiaries for all government funded programmes and this could also become a precedent to further curtail other rights of panchayati raj institutions in the state.

 

2.     The Concept of Local Self Government and Self Rule:

India has a long history of local governments. Village panchayats have been powerful and self-contained for thousands of years. Elected local governments were accorded great respect even by the alien, colonial British government in India. To illustrate one telling instance, when the great freedom fighter Chittaranjan Das was elected as Mayor of Calcutta Municipal Corporation in 1924, he fought for, and won, the right to appoint his own chief executive officer within the interference of the Provincial Government. He then selected the 27 year old Subhash Chandra Bose as his chief executive, whose outstanding work was appreciated by all. Subhash Bose went on to be the Mayor of Calcutta, President of the Congress and finally became a legend in his own life time as a great freedom fighter. Jawaharlal Nehru, Vithalbhai Patel and Vallabhbhai Patel started their public life as leaders of local governance. In contrast, provincial governments came to power only in 1937 after the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Union government came to power only in 1947.

In the classical sense “Democracy” denotes a system of government providing for popular participation by a substantial number of citizens. From the ancient Greek and Roman times to the modern welfare States the concept of “Democracy” has matured tremendously both in conceptual terms and in practice.

The concept of popular sovereignty is fundamental to any democratic government. It is universally accepted that all governments, more particularly democratic ones, derive their authority and power from the consent of the governed. Therefore, for democracy to be effective, reasonable or meaningful it is imperative that the governmental functioning must, to the extent possible, derive its direct legitimacy from the sanction of the people who would be affected by such actions and decision making processes. Democracy and the Federal structure of our polity both constitute basic features of the Constitution, which are inviolable. The Preamble makes it clear that “we the people” are the true sovereigns in our democracy. People do not get their rights of self-government from the government; government is granted power by the people through transfer of their sovereignty to a limited extent. To make both concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘federal structure’ effective and meaningful the flow of government actions, to the extent possible, must derive their source from people’s participation. Democracy, as a basic feature, would necessarily mean the existence of systems that enable peoples’ participation at all levels.  Similarly, the federal structure cannot be a mere federalism between the Union and the States.  It would mean a federal structure comprising of levels that include local self-governments.

In a true democracy, the citizen is at the centre, and decision-making is in ever-enlarging concentric circles of government, depending on the necessity and complexity of the tasks associated with governance. All these circles or levels of government derive their legitimacy from the citizen, and exist to serve the citizen.

The principle of “subsidiarity” is that the individual and her family should decide most issues that affect them whenever and wherever possible. Closest to the individual are her personal liberties or fundamental rights, which are guaranteed to her in the Constitution. When the individual or her family cannot decide or deal with situations, collective decision-making and action becomes necessary. Such tasks ought to be entrusted to the local government as close to the people as possible. Only those tasks that cannot be handled by the local government ought to vest in State governments, and from thereon to the Union government. 

By its very nature amongst the various tiers of government, the tier at which the people would have a sense of direct participation or influence is the nearest tier of government, namely, the Panchayat or local government. All governmental actions at other levels get progressively farther removed from the people. The powers exercised by the Union government would be largely peripheral to the day-to-day lives of citizens.

The architects of the Indian Constitution also recognized the necessity of having strong local self-governments and provided for a directive principle in that regard at Article 40 of the constitution of India, which reads as follows: “The State shall take steps to organize village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government”

Despite the Directive Principles in the Constitution, many of the States observed the mandate of constituting and empowering local governments more in its breach.

 

3.     Violation of Constitutional provisions:

The 73^rd amendment to the Constitution

As reasonable steps for empowering and enabling the local governments to function as units of self-government were not taken, the need for amendments to the Constitution was felt. The Panchayati Raj system became part of the Constitution of India in 1993 through the 73^rd amendment, which was enacted in April 1993. This amendment gave local governments a constitutional basis and position by inserting a new part in the Constitution, namely, Part IX, dealing with the Panchayats. The relevant articles that come within Part IX of the Constitution are described below:

 

Article 243A defines a Grama Sabha as being a body of voters relating to a village within a Panchayat. Under the constitutional pattern, Grama Sabhas provide the foundation for effective Panchayat Raj.

 

Article 243-B provides that there shall be constituted in every State, Panchayats at the village, intermediate and district levels in accordance with the provisions of Part IX. In states with a population not exceeding twenty lakhs Panchayats at the intermediate level may not be constituted.

 

Article 243C empowers states to make provisions through law for the composition of Panchayats, subject to the provisions of Part IX of the Constitution.

 

Article 243D provides for Reservation of both seats and leadership positions for the Scheduled Castes, tribes and women in Panchayats.

 

Article 243E provides for a normal duration of 5 years for Panchayats and a gap of not more than 6 months between the expiry of the period and the conduct of the elections for the next term of the Panchayats, in certain circumstances.

 

Article 243K invests the authority of preparing the electoral rolls and conducting elections in the State Election Commission.

 

Article 243F empowers the State Government to make laws providing for disqualification for election as a member of the Panchayats.

 

Under Article 243J, the State can make law with respect to maintenance of accounts by the Panchayats and their Audit. 

 

Article 243-G is an important article and speaks of the powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats.  This article reads as follows:

“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by  law, endow 

the Panchayats with such powers and authority  as may  be  necessary  to  enable them to 

function  as  institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions for the 

devolution of  powers  and  responsibilities upon Panchayats at  the  appropriate level, subject  

to such conditions as may be specified therein,  with respect  to- 

the preparation  of plans for economic  development  and  social justice;

the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be 

entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule.”

Article 243-I states that every five years a State Finance Commission shall be constituted to review 

the financial position of the Panchayats and to make recommendations to the Governor as to the 

principles which should govern the distribution between the State and the Panchayats of the 

net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees leviable by the  State, which  may be divided 

between them under this Part and the  allocation between the Panchayats at all levels of their 

respective shares of such proceeds;

the determination of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned to, or appropriated 

by, the Panchayats;

the grants-in-aid to the Panchayats from the Consolidated  Fund of the State;

the measures needed to improve the financial position of the Panchayats;

any other matter referred to the Finance Commission by the Governor in the interests of sound 

finance of the Panchayats.

 

The Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution, which has to be read along with Article 243G, lists out several functions that may be transferred to panchayats by the legislation made by the States, in compliance with Part IX. The schedule is comprehensive in its coverage and lists out 29 functions that may be transferred to panchayats. Item 10 relates to rural housing. 

The guiding principle behind Part IX of the Constitution and the assisting provisions are a manifestation of the “Gram Swaraj” idea propounded by the Father of the Nation Mahatma Gandhi. The spirit of the Constitution is to empower Panchayats with certain functional mandates, give them a significant degree of autonomy and impart to them an element of self-reliance and self-sufficiency through fiscal transfers, taxation powers and tax assignments. However, the intent of Part IX is also that clearly, the Panchayats are expected to be constituted and to function as units of rural local self-government.

Article 243 G uses the operative terms “endow” and “devolution” with respect to powers given to Panchayats. In broad terms the scope of these words would cover the transfer of power over funds, power over functions and power over functionaries. Without the three going together with respect to any scheme, the process of endowment or devolution is not complete. Only if such endowment or devolution is complete, can the panchayat be expected to discharge its responsibility as a local self government.   

 

Article 243-N speaks of the continuance of existing laws with respect to Panchayats. It states that notwithstanding anything in the constitution, any provision of any law relating to Panchayats in force in a State immediately before the commencement of the Seventy-third Amendment Act, 1992, which is inconsistent with the provisions of Part IX, shall continue to be in force until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority or until the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is earlier. In Article 243N is implicit the premise that after one year of the coming into force of the 73^rd Amendment, no provision of any law that relates to Panchayats can exist, which is in violation or contravention of the Panchayati  Raj Act of the State concerned. In other words, the Panchayat law enacted under the provisions of Part IX of the Constitution would gain precedence over any provision of any law. It is thus clear that legislations empowering Panchayats with powers and responsibility have a special and predominant status.

If the entire purport of the 73rd amendment is looked into and construed in its proper spirit and if the same is read along with the Preamble of the Constitution of India by which “we the people” have solemnly resolved to constitute India into a ‘democratic republic’ it is evident that the very purpose of the Constitutional requirement of having Panchayats is to provide for local self-government. Though the Constitutional provisions make it clear that Panchayats shall be set up at the district, intermediate and village level, the State Governments concerned may endow them with functions through their enabling legislations. A reading of Article 243 G in its entirely would show that while states do have a degree of leeway in empowering the panchayats, such flexibility is considerably limited by the imperative that the “endowment of powers and authority” on the Panchayats ought to be “as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government.”

In other words, such endowment has to be real and not cosmetic. In addition, the endowment of such functions must have specific regard to the preparation of plans and implementation thereof for economic development and social justice. The usurping of these functions through the pending amendment to the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act  with regard to the choice of beneficiaries and the implementation of housing  (a subject enumerated in the Eleventh Schedule) and other programmes funded by government, renders the entire 73^rd constitutional amendment meaningless and futile.

 

Parallel bodies are those set up as directed by the State or Central Governments to plan and/or execute development projects in areas, which are in the functional domain of Panchayats, using funds provided by the State or Central Governments or donor funds. They are called parallel because they have a separate system of decision making on resource allocation and execution of projects which is independent and removed from the Panchayat Raj set up. These parallel bodies could have in them bureaucrats, MLAs, elected representatives and, even, non-officials, NGO and community representatives in decision making positions. They have considerable autonomy, flexible procedures and function in isolation, directly reporting to the State Government and some times to the Central Government. Examples of parallel bodies are the District Rural Development Agencies (DRDAs), Forest Development Agencies (FDAs), Societies set up for Sarva Shisksha Abhiyaan (SSA), Societies set up for different health programmes such as Blindness Control, TB Eradication, AIDS Control, Filariasis Eradication and District Project Management Units of Externally-assisted Projects.

This amendment seeks to create parallel bodies, an attempt that has been tried with several schemes such as the recent Suvarna Grama Programme. These schemes were sought to be implemented through institutional arrangements that run parallel to the Panchayats and are supervised and managed by officers who are not accountable to the Panchayats.

 

Now the Government of Karnataka seeks to make this a law, through an amendment do not comply with the law.

 

The Constitution envisages harmonization not only of laws but also of institutional mechanisms with the Panchayat Raj System. The principle of concomitance cannot be limited to just laws but it extends to institutional arrangements as well. Viewed in this sense such institutions have to be harmonized with the PRI set up or else they become ultra vires the Constitution. Parallel bodies pose a serious threat to the growth and maturation of PRIs as institutions of Local Self Government. Half way solutions are not possible. The pending amendment to the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act 2007 would amount to being both unconstitutional and illegal. Specifically, they would offend the following provisions of the Constitution and the law.

 

Article 243 G is violated:

Under Article 243 G, the State legislation may endow the Panchayats by law with such powers as may be required to function as institutions of self government.  Such laws may also provide for the required devolution of powers for the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to Panchayats including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule. It is in pursuance of this obligation that States have passed their respective Panchayati Raj Acts. In such circumstances, once the law has been enacted by the State transferring the subjects to PRIs, the constitution prohibits the State from developing schemes dealing with the very same aspects and operating them directly. The Constitution prohibits the State from transferring such subjects away from the PRIs through executive orders.

While Article 243G gives the power to States to determine the scope and ambit of Panchayati Raj, this cannot be misinterpreted to include reversal of Panchayati Raj. The movement of Panchayati Raj should be forward, even if the speed may be slow. It cannot be a see-saw approach.

The Standing Committee of the Parliament on Rural Development in its recent report, recently laid on the table of the Lok Sabha has expressed its serious concern on the slow progress of Panchayati Raj, as also on the trend in some States to take steps to reverse Panchayati Raj.

The relevant provisions of the Karnataka Panchayati Raj Acts are violated:

Provisions of the Karnataka Panchayati Raj Acts, enacted under Article 243 G have the force of law and are mandatory. When such is the case, no deviation can be attempted by creating schemes dealing with the very same functions and having guidelines that violate the provisions of the law.

 

Article 243 N is violated:

Under Article 243 N, the time of one year has been given in order to bring all laws dealing with Panchayats in accordance with Part IX of the Constitution and Karnataka complied with this through its order of 16^th October 2004. This Article shows that Panchayat Raj Acts have a special status with respect to all other legislations. When other laws themselves are constitutionally deemed to be subject to the PR Acts, then schemes should also comply with the PRI Act. Therefore no schemes can be operated directly by departments with respect to those functions that stand transferred to Panchayats under the Panchayati Raj Acts.

 

 

4.     Violation of PRA-Karnataka and order of 16^th Oct 2003:

Grama Sabhas have been given a unique position as institutions of participatory governance under the Constitution. Article 243A defines a Grama Sabha as being a body of voters relating to a village within a Panchayat. Under the constitutional pattern, Grama Sabhas provide the foundation for effective Panchayat Raj. The Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act 1993 initially had provided for relatively weak Grama Sabhas. Under Section 3 of the Act, while Grama Sabhas were to meet at least once in six months, if Grama Panchayats failed to convene Grama Sabhas, then the Executive Officer of the Taluk Panchayat concerned could convene them. Grama Sabha only had recommendatory powers under the law. The law also provided that in case the Grama Sabha failed to identify the beneficiaries within a reasonable time, the Executive Officer shall, in consultation with the Grama Panchayat, identify the beneficiaries. Obviously, there was low confidence about the capacity and interest of Grama Sabhas and they were routinely ignored by higher levels.

In respect of beneficiary selection the new law left no room for doubt. Section 3(3)(b) of the amended Act 2003, provided that Ward Sabhas would identify the most eligible persons from its area for beneficiary-oriented schemes on the basis of criteria fixed and prepare lists of eligible beneficiaries in order of priority and forward it to the Grama Panchayat. These lists were then to be placed by the Grama Panchayat before the Grama Sabha, which under Section 3A (3) (c) would consider the Ward Sabha lists and prepare the final lists of eligible beneficiaries in order of priority. For good measure, the law also provided that once such detailed beneficiary lists were prepared by the Grama Sabha; they could not be changed by any higher authority.

Last week’s amendment has set the clock back. It inserts similarly worded provisos to Section 3(3) (b) and 3A (3) (c), stating that if the Grama Panchayat fails to discharge its duties in respect of housing schemes or programmes funded by the Government, then a committee headed by the member of the legislative assembly of the constituency shall select the beneficiaries from the list prepared by the Grama Panchayat. At one stroke, the legislator becomes the final arbiter over decisions of the Grama Sabha! These provisos are dangerously open ended. Who is to decide that a Grama Panchayat has failed to discharge its duties? Who will constitute the committee? Why specifically mention housing schemes? What is the implication of providing scope for taking away the powers of the Grama Sabha in respect of all Schemes of the Government? What makes the MLAs or government official (who is so far removed from the people of a village) better able to decide who should benefit from a scheme, that the rural voter who knows intimately every resident of her/his village?

The amendments made in 2003 were passed unanimously and followed after a year of discussion, including before the Joint Select Committee. In fact the 2003 amendment was approved by His Excellency Shri. T.N. Chathurvedi. Now this is being reversed without any consideration of the matter, in a space of a week!

 

5.     Gram Sabhas not Being Convened:

It is true that many Panchayats are not convening Gram Sabhas and this is a serious dereliction of duty by the Gram Panchayat. As provided by the Guidelines for the Conduct of Gram Sabhas, 1999, there are provisions for the Executive Officer of the taluk to direct the Panchayat Secretary to convene the Gram Sabha if the Gram Panchayat Adhyaksha fails to do so.

In Karnataka, staff have been denied to the Panchayats since a long time. No Panchayat secretaries have been recruited since more than a decade, except through compassionate appointments, filling up of backlog vacancies reserved for SCs and STs and promotion of untrained bill collectors. Therefore, even if Gram Sabhas may not have been held in some Panchayats, this is in a large measure due to the failure of the Government to provide adequate staff to the Panchayats, or in the alternative, to permit Panchayats to recruit their own Staff to strengthen their secretariats.

 

6.     Beneficiaries are not being selected and funds are lapsing:

As per section 3 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, the Grama Sabhas are the deciding body with the regard to the selection of beneficiaries for housing and other schemes. This is the only platform that recognises the right of every citizen to participate in decision making, a major step towards realising self governance and this amendment revokes this right.

 

The amendment to the Panchayat Raj Act virtually puts MLAs in the driver’s seat in respect of the selection of any beneficiary for any scheme. The amendment will ensure that we, the people, will held to ransom by our MLAs who want to usurp virtually all powers, including those given to constitutionally mandated local bodies.

 

The main trigger that set the MLAs on this course of action was their loss of power and control over government funded programmes. There are innumerable government schemes; the central government funded schemes by the Rajiv Gandhi Housing Corporation alone are 7 including the Ashraya, Ambedkar rural and urban and Indira Awaz Yojana. These programmes are a large source of kick backs from individual beneficiaries and contractors and also a way of collecting potential ‘grateful’ voters. In the year 2006-7 in Karnataka, the Ashraya Scheme alone distributed more than 3,54,000 houses at Rs: 25,000 per home. While the STSC community receive this as a full subsidy other BPL families availed a 50% subsidy and a 50% as a repayable loan. Of the 3,54,000 beneficiaries at least 20-30% were bogus, many already possessing homes and others concocting false proof of construction in collusion with their MLAs.

 

The normal procedure is that Gram Panchayats are notified about these programmes very late and are given very short notice, rarely more than 10 days, within which they have to call a Gram Sabha (giving 1 weeks notice). The common scene at such gram sabhas is that ‘thugs’ sent by the MLAs disrupt the proceeding resulting in the termination of the gram sabhas and of course by then there is no time to call another one! The beneficiaries are not selected, the funds lapse and the MLAs crow about the inefficiencies of the Panchayats! In March 2007 an order was passed that the choice of beneficiaries shall be done at gram sabhas called for the purpose and that the proceeding be compulsorily video graphed. This is posing problems for MLAs and so the amendment. 

 

 

7.     Strangulation of Gram Panchayats:

This amendment has been a long time coming. Various obvious and not so obvious means have been adopted over the years to institutionally weaken Panchayati Raj, not through the law, but through executive actions. Now the Government of Karnataka wishes to solve this through one amendment.

Some of the executive means used so far are as follows:

Fiscal Strangulation:

(a)    Deny funds to Panchayats, except for a few central or state schemes, which are expressly mandated to be implemented by Panchayats.

(b)   Even though budget windows are formally created, continue mismatch between functional and financial allocations. (Karnataka, till 2004 October, when the mismatch was largely corrected, except for a few gaps. Now the mismatch is again growing.)

(c)    Allocate funds to Panchayats in budgets, and then deny access to them in treasuries.

      (d)   Pretend to give money to Panchayats, use them elsewhere.

(e)    Quietly write back funds given to Panchayats, as part of ‘structural adjustment’. (In Karnataka, in 2003-4, funds available in ZP accounts were written back to the State, without a word of warning. While some of the allocations written back were notional, such as salary savings, others were not, such as own revenues of ZPs and Earnest Deposits made by contractors bidding for tenders. The entire ZP mechanism ground to a halt in the peak working season as a result. Staff went without salaries for several months, before the matter was sorted out.)

(f)     Cut allocations at source. (In Karnataka, electricity installations were not metered then billed on capacity and lump sum pro-rata deductions were made from Panchayats, thereby leaving no incentive for either metered billing or electricity saving by Panchayats. Matters were sorted out through a settlement on arrears followed by a new discipline of metering and billing. The Electricity companies defaulted on metering and Panchayats defaulted on payments even where they were metered. There is a standoff again and arrears have jumped to Rs. 600 crore plus.)

(g)    Deny tax assignments to Panchayats, on the ground of rationalization. (Karnataka gave about Rs. 40 lakhs to each Taluk Panchayat through the assignment of a surcharge on registration. In 2003-04, the surcharge was merged with the registration fee, as part of rationalization, again an idea of the World Bank. Since the surcharge did not exist, allocations to TPs came down to Rs. 1.5 lakhs!)

 

Functional Strangulation:

(h)    Create parallel bodies (numerous examples such as the recent Suvarna Grama Programme.)

(i)      Deny existence of circulars empowering Panchayats – say that official copies are required. (In Karnataka, all circulars are placed in the State’s official magazine, Karnataka Vikasa, which goes to every Panchayats. Even though written instructions exist that these circulars are to be treated as official copies, Panchayat secretaries routinely decline to operate them, stating that they do not have ‘official copies’.)

 

8.     Violation of Gram Panchayat voters rights:

This pending amendment, besides taking away the right of rural voters to choose beneficiaries for all programmes, including those funded by government and all housing schemes, it also usurps the rural voters power to monitor their Gram Panchayats.

The State Government and MLAs argue that the Gram Panchayats are not holding Gram Sabhas for the selection of beneficiaries and therefore potential beneficiaries are deprived of development schemes. The onus of this lapse lies with the rural voter, who is either a potential beneficiary or is the ‘neighbour’ to a potential beneficiary! If the Gram Panchayat fails to call for a Gram Sabha it is duty of the rural voter to ‘make’ the Gram Panchayat function and ensure that it carries out its duties. Further, if the voters fail to exercise their right to participate in local government and thereby fail to enable the implementation of schemes and programmes that benefit they will have to live with the consequences of their actions. As a rural voter, one has not elected ones MLA to usurp the functions of Gram Sabha nor mandated them to enforce the accountability of a Gram Panchayat.

The Panchayati Raj system was seen as a self correcting mechanism with civil society pressure and participation as the ultimate means of ensuring the accountability of local governments.

 

9.     The Solution:

The solution to this is a greater dose of democracy and not an unconstitutional illegal move. Some argue that if the MLAs misuse their newly found powers under the pending amendment that the rural voters will rise up in protest and demand their right, at which time the state government will have to restore their constitutional mandate. This argument applies right now - rural voters will rise up in protest and demand that their Gram Panchayats function the way they should. The answer is to allow democracy to work. The central and state governments have had 60 years to prove themselves and there is still a lot to be desired when it comes to their ability to govern justly and free of the lure of power and corruption. Panchayats have less than 20 years to learn local self governance handicapped by the constraints of state politics. Let democracy take its course, we must not lose faith in the capacity of India’s people to determine their lives. Let us show the world that we are not just the largest democracy, but also the most mature and civilised democracy.

 

THIS MEMORANDUM TO THE HONOURABLE GOVERNOR ON THE PENDING AMENDMENT TO THE KARNATAKA PANCHAYATI RAJ ACT HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY

1. Smt Nandana Reddy, Director Development, The Concerned for Working Children and Member, National General Council, NCERT
2. Shri L C Jain, Former Member of Planning Commission & Former Ambassador to South Africa
3. Shri Vinod Vyasulu, Centre for Budget and Policy Studies
4. Shri Manaohar Kulkarni, Member, Prime Minister’s national Commission on Population
5. Prof. Vijay Chandru, Chairman & CEO, Strandgenomics; Director Pico Peta Simputers
6. Kavita Ratna, Director – Communications, The Concerned for Working Children
7. Damodar Acharya, Executive Director, The Concerned for Working Children, India
8. Dr. Suchithra Vedanth, State Programme Director, Mahila Samakhya Karnataka
9. Ganapathi MM, Asst. Director, The Concerned for Working Children, India
10. Lolichen P J, Asst. Director, The Concerned for Working Children, India

 

 

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